Abstract. This study aims to investigate the empirical evidence on the impact of corporate governance on earnings management and tax evasion in public companies. The scope of this study is companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange except those in financial, real estate, and telecommunication industries. Panel regression method was employed to run the data on samples for five-yearperiod (2012)(2013)(2014)(2015)(2016). The results show that several corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in detecting earnings management, namely the institutional ownership, the percentage of independent commissioners, and percentage of audit committee members with finance/accounting background. For tax evasion, only the size of the board of commissioners that plays a role in detecting the practice. The results have practical implication on improving several corporate governance mechanisms to effectively tackle unethical practices such as earnings management and tax avoidance.
Introduction
One of the conflicts of interest between owners and management is represented in the manipulation of a company's financial statements; which can be in the form of earnings management. This can be detrimental to investors as the inappropriate financial statement information provided by management can bring difficulties to investors in making decisions.
Earnings management practices can also be used by companies to control their earnings that will impact taxes at the same time. Good corporate governance can play an important role in mitigating the problems of corporate earnings management and tax avoidance. This research discusses the issues of earnings management, tax evasion and corporate governance which is a development of previous research conducted by [1] ; [2] ; [3] . The objective of this research is to find empirical evidence using current data on the role of corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating earnings management and tax avoidance practices.
Method

Sample Selection
The samples taken in this research are public companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) from 2012-2016. To investigate earnings management, the companies in the banking industry, other financial services, telecommunications, and real estate are excluded as they have different regulations [4] . The other reason is that the Jones model to measure the earnings management cannot be applied to the financial industry. To investigate tax avoidance, companies in the banking industry and other financial services are excluded, as well as companies experiencing losses as it will bring different consequences on the applicable tax rate. (4) where: Non-discretionary accrual (NDAC) is the fitted value of the above equations while the discretionary accrual (DAC) is the residual value. In accordance with [5] , in this study, we use a cross-sectional model, where each model is estimated separately for each combination of years and industrial group of companies.
Research model
∆REV i.t :
b. Tax evasion
The next dependent variable is tax evasion measured by ETR or effective tax rate calculated using the formula below: 
Independent Variables a. Institutional ownership
Institutional ownership is defined as financial institutions such as insurance company, bank, pension fund, and investment banking [4] . b. Audit Committee Audit committee consists of at least a chairman who is also an independent commissioner and two independent external members. c. Number of audit committee meetings
The frequency of meetings between members of the audit committee is measured by the number of audit meetings within one year.
d. Percentage of audit committees with a financial/accounting background The proportion of an audit committee with a financial/accounting background is calculated by dividing the total number of audit committees with a financial background to the total members of the audit committee. e. Size of boards of commissioners
The size of the board of commissioners is defined as the number of board of commissioners member in a company. f. Percentage of the independent board of commissioners Based on the regulations of the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) Number Kep305 / BEJ / 07 2004 any company that has an independent commissioner of at least 30% (thirty percent) of the total members of the board of commissioners has fulfilled the corporate governance guidelines. Information on the number of independent board of commissioners obtained from annual reports of each company.
Result
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics are used to look at the characteristics of each variable in the research model which is s presented in the following table. 
Regression results
Prior to conducting the regression test, the data has been checked for the classical assumptions and no multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity problems found. The institutional ownership has a positive effect on earnings who states that earnings management can be efficient, not always opportunistic [4] . The size of boards of commissioners has no significant impact on earnings management, which can be seen from the p-value of 0.225 with coefficient -0.0032. This reflects the irrelevance of board of commissioners size in detecting earnings management.
Discussion
The percentage of the independent board of commissioners has a positive effect on earnings management, as seen from the p-value of 0.004 at a significant level of 1% with a coefficient of 0.0975. This result is in line who examined the relationship between the composition of the board of commissioners and the fraudulent f financial reporting and found that the fraudulent company had a lower percentage of the independent board of commissioners than the nonfraudulent company [6] .
The audit committee size negatively affects earnings management which is consistent [7] .The audit committee meeting has no significant effect which is consistent stating that audit committee members who meet at least four times a year cannot reduce fraud in the financial reporting process [7] . This might be because the meeting is conducted for the regulatory purpose only and hence is not able to carry out its duties and responsibilities to the maximum which causes its function and role is not effective [8] .
The number of audit committees with a financial/accounting background has a negative effect on earnings management, which is consistent stating that audit committees with expertise in finance/accounting effectively oversee the possibility of earnings management [9] ; [7] . The results show that only board of commissioner size that has a significant positive effect on tax evasion, reflecting that other corporate governance mechanisms are not able to prevent tax evasion.
Conclusion
This research is conducted with the aim to investigate the role of corporate governance on earnings management and tax evasion. Based on the result of the empirical test, several corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in detecting earnings management, namely the institutional ownership, the percentage of independent commissioners, and percentage of audit committee members with finance/accounting background. As for tax evasion, only the size of the board of commissioners that plays a role in detecting the practice. The results bring practical implications on the need to improve several corporate governance mechanisms to help resolve unethical practices in the form of earnings management and tax evasion.
